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serve to put draftsmen of broad arbitration provisions on notice that
if judicial resolution of the issue of compliance with conditions precedent is desired, the conditions must be express. Absent such a
clear characterization, the question will be decided by the arbitrator.
Sharon M. Heim
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

CPL § 310.50(2): Jury's noncompliance with trial court's
instructions does not, per se, require resubmission of verdict
Under CPL § 310.50(2), "the court. . . must direct the jury to
reconsider" its verdict when the verdict "is not in accordance with
the [trial] court's instructions .

,0 Recently, however, in

*"...

People v. Robinson,'41 the Court of Appeals held that unless the
jury's intention with respect to individual counts of an indictment
is unclear, the failure of a jury to comply with the court's instruc42
tions does not, per se, require resubmission of the case.
The defendant in Robinson was charged with criminal sale,
criminal possession with intent to sell and simple possession of a
controlled substance.13 Before submitting the case to the jury, the
judge properly instructed it to consider the lesser included offenses 144 of criminal possession with intent to sell and simple possession
Educ. Ass'n, 84 Misc. 2d 675, 376 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. Oswego County 1975). It is submitted that the Norkin decision will have the effect of minimizing the difference between commercial arbitration and collective bargaining.
140
CPL § 310.50(2) provides in pertinent part:
If the jury renders a verdict which in form is not in accordance with the court's
instructions or which is otherwise legally defective, the court must explain the
defect or error and must direct the jury to reconsider such verdict, to resume its
deliberation for such purpose, and to render a proper verdict.
CPL § 310.50(2) represents a codification of CCP §§ 447-449 (1881) in revised form. See CPL
§ 310.50(2), commentary at 593 (1971).
14 45 N.Y.2d 448, 382 N.E.2d 759, 410 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1978).
2 Id. at 452, 382 N.E.2d at 761, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
"4 Id. at 451, 382 N.E.2d at 760, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 60. The defendant, Marion Robinson,
was indicted for his alleged participation in two separate drug transactions. The six-count
indictment charged him with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree,
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.41(1) (Supp. 1978-1979); criminal sale of a controlled substance in the
third degree, id. § 220.39(1); two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance with
intent to sell in the third degree, id. § 220.16(1); criminal possession of a controlled substance
in the fifth degree, id. § 220.09(1); criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh
degree, id. § 220.03.
" 45 N.Y.2d at 451, 382 N.E.2d at 760, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 60. CPL § 1.20(37) defines lesser
included offense as follows: "when it is impossible to commit a particular crime without
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in the alternative and render a guilty verdict on no more than one
of the two charges. 45 Despite these instructions, the jury convicted
the defendant of both possession with intent to sell and simple
possession."' The court dismissed the simple possession count sua
sponte. 7 Upon the defendant's objection to this action," 8 the trial
concomitantly committing, by the same conduct, another offense of lesser grade or degree,
the latter is, with respect to the former, a 'lesser included offense.'" CPL § 1.20(37) (1971).
Whether an offense qualifies as a "lesser included offense" is determined with reference to
the particular conduct at issue in the case rather than the abstract statutory definition of
the crimes charged. See People v. Johnson, 39 N.Y.2d 364, 368, 348 N.E.2d 564, 566, 384
N.Y.S.2d 108, 110 (1976); People v. Stanfield, 36 N.Y.2d 467, 472, 330 N.E.2d 75, 78, 369
N.Y.S.2d 118, 122 (1975).
' Upon motion, the trial court must submit a lesser included offense to the jury for
consideration in the alternative if there is a "reasonable view of the evidence which would
support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser offense but did not commit the
greater." CPL § 300.50(1) (1971); see, e.g., People v. Johnson, 39 N.Y.2d 364, 367, 348 N.E.2d
564, 565, 384 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109 (1976); People v. Shuman, 37 N.Y.2d 302, 304, 333 N.E.2d
363, 364, 372 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61 (1975); People v. Asan, 22 N.Y.2d 526, 529-30, 239 N.E.2d 913,
915, 293 N.Y.S.2d 326, 328 (1968). CPL § 300.50 appears to be a codification of the "some
basis in evidence" test articulated in People v. Mussenden, 308 N.Y. 558, 127 N.E.2d 551
(1955). The Mussenden court stated that "submission of. . .an included crime is justified
only where there is some basis in the evidence for finding the accused innocent of the higher
crime, and yet guilty of the lower one." Id. at 563, 127 N.E.2d at 554, accord, People v. Asan,
22 N.Y.2d 526, 239 N.E.2d 913, 293 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1968); People v. Malave, 21 N.Y.2d 26,
233 N.E.2d 269, 286 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1967); People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35 (1927).
Under CPL § 300.50(1) the court must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable
to the defendant. If there is some basis for acquitting him of the higher charge, the lesser
included charges must be submitted to the jury, despite any belief the court may hold that
the defendant is guilty of the more serious crime. People v. Shuman, 37 N.Y.2d 302, 304, 333
N.E.2d 363, 365, 372 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (1975) (citing People v. Mussenden, 308 N.Y. 558, 562,
127 N.E.2d 551, 554 (1955)); People v. Usher, 39 App. Div. 2d 459, 336 N.Y.S.2d 935 (4th
Dep't 1972), affl'd, 34 N.Y.2d 600, 310 N.E.2d 547, 354 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1974). When a jury
which has been instructed to render a verdict on lesser charges fails to do so, the defective
verdict operates as an acquittal on each ignored count if it is accepted by the court. CPL §
310.50 (1971). Under the double jeopardy rule, the defendant cannot be retried on one of the
ignored counts even if his conviction on the more serious charge subsequently is reversed. See
People v. Dowling, 84 N.Y. 478 (1881). On the other hand, if the court failed to instruct the
jury to render a verdict on lesser included counts, its silence is not equivalent to acquittal.
See People v. Jackson, 20 N.Y.2d 440, 231 N.E.2d 722, 285 N.Y.S.2d 8,cert. denied, 391 U.S.
928 (1968).
It has been noted that both the state and the defendant benefit when lesser included
crimes are considered by the jury. The prosecution benefits by having an additional opportunity to obtain a conviction even if it fails to prove some element of the higher crime, while the
defendant is afforded the opportunity of being found guilty of a less serious crime than that
charged. See People v. Mussenden, 308 N.Y. 558, 561-62, 127 N.E.2d 551, 553 (1955).
" 45 N.Y.2d at 451, 382 N.E.2d at 760, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 60. The jury found the defendant
not guilty on the criminal sale of a controlled substance counts. Id.
"I Id.-Before dismissing the simple possession counts, the court recorded the verdict in
accordance with CPL § 310.80.
I" The defendant contended that the verdict was inconsistent and illegal because the
jury misunderstood the court's instructions. 45 N.Y.2d at 451, 382 N.E.2d at 760, 410
N.Y.S.2d at 60.
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court polled the jurors,'49 who indicated that they did intend to
convict the defendant of both charges. 5 The trial judge concluded
that the verdict was neither inconsistent nor illegal 5 ' and refused
to resubmit the case to the jury for reconsideration. 5 2 The Appellate
53
Division, First Department, affirmed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Judge Jasen, writing
for a unanimous Court, rejected the defendant's contention that
resubmission was mandated under CPL § 310.50(2) solely because
the jury's verdict did not conform to the trial court's instructions. 54
The Court distinguished the issue in Robinson from that presented
in People v. Salemmo,155 in which the resubmission of a nonconforming verdict was upheld.' While both Salemmo and Robinson
involved a jury's failure to consider lesser included counts only in
the alternative despite instructions to the contrary, Judge Jasen
noted that the sole issue before the Salemmo Court was whether
the trial court's decision to resubmit a not guilty verdict on one of
the charges was precluded under CPL § 310.50(2). 117 Addressing
"I See note 167 infra.
15045 N.Y.2d at 451, 382 N.E.2d at 760, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
'- Since each count in an indictment is regarded as a separate indictment, a finding of
guilt on some counts and innocence on others does not necessarily constitute a legally defective verdict. See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932); People v. Delorio, 33 App.
Div. 2d 350, 353, 308 N.Y.S.2d 131, 135 (3d Dep't 1970); People ex ret Troiani v. Fay, 13 App.
Div. 2d 999, 1000, 216 N.Y.S.2d 394, 397 (2d Dep't 1961). Where the crimes have identical
elements, however, a verdict of guilty on one and not guilty on the other is repugnant and
therefore defective. See, e.g., People v. Gross, 51 App. Div. 2d 191, 197-98, 379 N.Y.S.2d 885,
893 (4th Dep't 1976); People v. Bullis, 30 App. Div. 2d 470, 472, 294 N.Y.S.2d 331, 333 (4th
Dep't 1968). Similarly, a verdict convicting a defendant and acquitting a codefendant is
legally defective if the evidence does not support the inconsistent finding. People v. Munroe,
190 N.Y. 435, 438, 80 N.E. 476, 478 (1908). In addition, if the jury finds a defendant guilty of
two inconsistent crimes based upon one act, its verdict is regarded as "repugnant." People
v. Clarke, 56 App. Div. 2d 851, 851, 392 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (2d Dep't 1977). But cf. People v.
Broome, 21 App. Div. 2d 899, 899, 251 N.Y.S.2d 747, 749 (2d Dep't 1964), rev'd on other
grounds, 15 N.Y.2d 985, 207 N.E.2d 603, 260 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1965) (conviction of inconsistent
crimes based upon one act does not require reversal of entire judgment or new trial). A
mistake by the jury with regard to the law of intent has also been said to result in mandatory
resubmission. See People v. Haymes, 34 N.Y.2d 639, 311 N.E.2d 509, 355 N.Y.S.2d 376
(mem.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003 (1974).
1 45 N.Y.2d at 451, 382 N.E.2d at 760, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
15356 App. Div. 2d 756, 756, 392 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (lst Dep't 1977). In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Murphy argued that the trial court did not have the power to dismiss the simple
possession count under CPL § 310.50(2). 56 App. Div. 2d at 757, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 37 (Murphy,
J., dissenting) (citing People v. Salemmo, 38 N.Y.2d 357, 360, 342 N.E.2d 579, 580, 379
N.Y.S.2d 809, 811 (1976)); see note 163 infra.
"5 45 N.Y.2d at 452, 382 N.E.2d at 761, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
38 N.Y.2d 357, 342 N.E.2d 579, 379 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1976).
45 N.Y.2d at 452, 382 N.E.2d at 761, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
07 Id. at 453, 382 N.E.2d at 761, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 61. The defendant in Satemmo was
indicted for his alleged involvement in an illegal narcotics transaction. Although the jury was
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the question not presented in Salemmo, the Robinson Court
stated that "resubmission is required only where the verdict...
exhibits a confusion on the part of the jury such that its intention
with respect to individual counts . . is uncertain."' 15
In Robinson, Judge Jasen concluded, the jury clearly intended
to convict the defendant of possession with intent to sell, while its
guilty verdict with respect to the simple possession charge was
"mere surplusage."'' The Court observed that to jurors unfamiliar
with the concept of lesser included offenses, a conviction of possession would appear entirely consistent with a conviction of possession
with intent to sell. 6 ' In addition, Judge Jasen noted, it has been a
common practice of appellate courts to dismiss convictions on a
lower charge when it would have been impossible for the defendant
to have committed the greater offense without having committed
the lesser included offense as well."'1 He perceived no reason why the
properly instructed, it found the defendant guilty of both criminal sale and criminal possession with intent to sell a dangerous drug, while acquitting him of the lesser charge of criminal
possession. 38 N.Y.2d at 359, 342 N.E.2d at 579, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11. As a result of its
noncompliance with instructions, the trial judge resubmitted the verdict to the jury, whereupon it found the defendant guilty solely of criminal possession. Id., 342 N.E.2d at 580, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 811. On appeal, the Salemmo defendant invoked the portion of CPL § 310.50(2)
which provides that "if it is clear that the jury intended to find a defendant not guilty upon
any particular count, the court must order that the verdict be recorded as an acquittal of such
defendant upon such count." CPL § 310.50(2) (1971). Affirming the defendant's conviction,
the Salemmo Court concluded that the verdict's inherent inconsistency reflected the jury's
confusion. Since it was impossible to find that the first verdict was a clear indication of the
jury's intention to acquit on the simple possession count, the Court reasoned, entry of an
acquittal was not statutorily mandated. 38 N.Y.2d at 361, 342 N.E.2d at 581, 379 N.Y.S.2d
at 812.
'' 45 N.Y.2d at 453, 382 N.E.2d at 761, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
'
Id. at 453, 382 N.E.2d at 761, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 62. A verdict which is otherwise valid
is not rendered defective by the presence of an unauthorized finding by the jury, often termed
"surplusage." In People v. Syph, 74 Misc. 2d 466, 344 N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sup. Ct. Erie County
1973), for example, a recommendation of "leniency" which accompanied the jury's guilty
verdict was deemed "surplusage," since it could be excised without impairing the otherwise
valid verdict. In extending the concept of "surplusage" to include an improper guilty verdict
on a lesser included charge, Judge Jasen relied on the decision in United States v. Howard,
507 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1974). Addressing facts similar to those in Robinson, the Howardcourt
observed that, since it found the defendant guilty of the greater offense, the jury "must
necessarily have concluded that all of the elements of the lesser included offenses were
present." Id. at 563 (citation omitted).
'~' 45 N.Y.2d at 453, 382 N.E.2d at 761-62, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
"' Id., 382 N.E.2d at 762, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 62. The Court cited cases in which larceny
convictions were dismissed when the defendant also was convicted of robbery. People v. Lee,
39 N.Y.2d 388, 390, 348 N.E.2d 579, 581, 384 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (1976); People v. Johnson,
39 N.Y.2d 364, 370, 348 N.E.2d 564, 567, 384 N.Y.S.2d 108, 111 (1976); People v. Grier, 37
N.Y.2d 847, 848, 340 N.E.2d 471, 471, 378 N.Y.S.2d 37, 38 (1975) (mem.); People v. Pyles,
44 App. Div. 2d 784, 784, 355 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105 (1st Dep't 1974). In addition, the Court cited
a number of cases in which criminal possession of controlled substances charges were dis-
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same power of dismissal
should not be exercised in the first instance
2
by the trial court.11

The Robinson decision appears to represent an attempt on the
part of the Court of Appeals to dispel any misapprehensions that
might have been created by a particularly broad statement that
appeared in the Salemmo opinion. Although the Salemmo Court
stated that "the law now specifically mandates that a court direct
the jury to reconsider its verdict where the form of the verdict is not
inaccord with. . . instructions,' 6 3 the Robinson opinion indicates
that resubmission is not always required in cases where the intention of the jury is readily discernible despite its failure to follow
instructions." 4
It is submitted, however, that this limitation on the general
mandate imposed by CPL § 310.50(2) has no application in situations where the verdict is defective for reasons other than the jurors'
noncompliance with the court's instructions regarding lesser included offenses.'65 Where the jury finds the defendant guilty of two
missed when the defendant was convicted of criminal sale counts as well. People v. Rivers,
59 App. Div. 2d 847, 847, 399 N.Y.S.2d 12, 12-13 (1st Dep't 1977); People v. Rodriguez, 54
App. Div. 2d 949, 949, 388 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (2d Dep't 1976)k People v. Lugo, 53 App. Div.
2d 650, 650, 384 N.Y.S.2d 492, 492 (2d Dep't 1976). In each of these cases, the defendant was
convicted of both the lesser included offense and the more serious crime after the trial court
failed to instruct the jury of its duty to consider the charges in the alternative. The convictions
on the lesser included offenses were dismissed by the appellate courts under CPL §
300.40(3)(b), which provides: "[a] verdict of guilty upon the greatest count submitted is
deemed a dismissal of every lesser count submitted .. " CPL § 300.40(3)(b) (1971). Although none of these cases involved dual convictions in contravention of the trial court's
specific instructions, the Robinson Court did not find the distinction significant. 45 N.Y.2d
at 454, 382 N.E.2d at 762, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
I6 45 N.Y.2d at 454, 382 N.E.2d at 762, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
"s 38 N.Y.2d at 360, 342 N.E.2d at 580, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 811. The Salemmo Court
contrasted the language in CPL 310.50(2) with the provisions of one of its predecessors, CCP
§ 447 (repealed 1970), which gave the trial judge discretion to return a verdict to the jury for
reconsideration when "'it appears to the court that the jury have mistaken the law.'" 38
N.Y.2d at 360, 342 N.E.2d at 580, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 811 (quoting Code Crim. Proc. § 447
(repealed 1970)). This discussion in Salemmo apparently prompted the dissenters to the
appellate division's decision in Robinson to conclude that the trial court erred in refusing to
resubmit the case. See 56 App. Div.2d at 757, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 37 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
"I The result in Robinson is in accord with those portions of CPL § 310.50(2) which
permit the entry of a judgment of acquittal "if it is clear that the jury intended to find [the]
defendant not guilty upon any. . . count." Similarly, the decision seems consistent with one
of the predecessors of CPL § 310.50(2), which provided that improper verdicts should be
returned to the jury until such time as they were rendered in a form "from which it [could]
be clearly understood what [was] the intent of the jury ...." CCP § 448 (repealed 1970).
Indeed, by refusing to require the trial court to perform the ritual of resubmission where the
jury's intent is clear, the Robinson Court seems to have restored to a limited extent the trial
court discretion implicit in the former rule.
16 In People v. Flowers, 44 App. Div. 2d 842, 355 N.Y.S.2d 642 (2d Dep't 1974), and
People v. Daughtry, 86 Misc. 2d 397, 381 N.Y.S.2d 730 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1974) (per
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crimes with mutually exclusive elements, for example, the verdict
would be illegal as well as nonconforming. 6 ' In such a case, a polling
6 7 and resubmission
of the jurors could not serve to cure the defect"
should be required notwithstanding the trial judge's belief that the
jury's underlying intention is clear. In contrast is the situation
where the jury returns convictions on more than one included offense. Although not required by the Robinson decision, it is suggested that a polling of the jurors, conducted priorto the dismissal
of the lesser included offenses, would provide a needed safeguard
intentions are accurately reflected in the
and insure that juries'
68
recorded verdicts.1
Robin J. Stalbow
curiam), aff'd without opinion, 38 N.Y.2d 972, 348 N.E.2d 613, 384 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1976),
appellate courts held that a trial judge erred in directing a not guilty verdict on an unauthorized use of a vehicle charge after the jury returned a guilty verdict on that count as well as
on a count charging criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree. Both the Flowers
and the Daughtry court concluded that, under such facts, CPL § 310.50(2) mandated the
resubmission of the case for reconsideration by the jury. In both cases, however, the verdicts
were improper because a finding of guilt with respect to unauthorized use of a vehicle is
legally incompatible with a finding of guilt with respect to criminal possession of stolen
LAw § 165.05 (1975 & Supp. 1978-1979) with N.Y. PENAL
property. Compare N.Y. PaL
LAW § § 165.40-.50 (1975). Thus, Flowers and Daughtry may be contrasted with Robinson, inwhich the verdict was technically defective but not substantively inconsistent. In light of this
distinction, it seems reasonable to assume that the Robinson ruling leaves undisturbed the
holdings in Flowers and Daughtry.
MeSee note 151 supra.

Polling the jury is an orthodox method for dispelling any doubts concerning a verdict
and has ample statutory support. CPL § 310.80 (1971) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he jury must, if either party makes such an application, be polled and each
juror separately asked whether the verdict announced by the foreman is in all
respects his verdict. If upon . . . the separate inquiry any juror answers in the
negative, the court must refuse to accept the verdict and must direct the jury to
resume its deliberation.
In addition to the statutory provision requiring polling upon motion, it has been held that a
trial judge on his own motion may poll the jury if any "suspicion or doubt was aroused" upon
announcement of the verdict. People v. Orr, 138 Misc. 535, 537, 246 N.Y.S. 673, 676 (Madison
County Ct. 1930). Thus, it probably is not improper for the trial judge to poll the jury to
eliminate any ambiguity when a verdict of guilty on two or more inclusory counts is rendered
contrary to instructions. Accord, United States v. Howard, 507 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1974).
Nevertheless, the polling procedure should not be used as a shortcut when there are indications of faulty jury deliberations.
I's It is the trial judge's responsibility to prevent legally-defective verdicts from being
entered upon the court's records. See People v. Salemmo, 38 N.Y.2d 357, 360, 342 N.E.2d
579, 580, 379 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811 (1976).
"1

